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Semiofficial Explanations of the June Moscow Purges

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A lead article appearing in <u>Partinaya Zhizn</u>, No. 13 (released to press on 17 July 1957) gives more details than heretofore available on the June purges and the reasons for it. Another quite interesting lead article on the same subject appears in the periodical <u>Agitator</u>, No 14 (released to press on 13 August 1957). Both of these articles merit examination, although they do not materially alter the views thus far gained of the reasons for the purge.

* * * *

In regard to the conducting of the Central Committee meeting, the Partinaya Zhizn article says that the degree of isolation of the Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov antiparty group from the party and the people is unprecedented in the existence of the CPSU. The full meeting of the Central Committee lasted for a week. It was attended by the regular and deputy members of the Central Committee and the members of the Central revision committee, with a total of 309 participants. Unlimited democracy prevailed, without any limiting regulations being applied to the speakers.

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The discussion was attended by 215 persons, and 60 of them made speeches. Those who had no opportunity to speak, presented their views in written form. Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov each spoke twice, and their written statements were read at the final session. Not one of those present supported the antiparty group.

The article states that the antiparty group sought to seize the party leadership, and that the struggle that developed in the Central Committee was of a deeply fundamental nature, since it was not concerned with personages, but instead, the policy into which they wished to force the party. The task of the party organizations now is to show the people the successes that have been achieved during the past three years by following the present policy.

The assumption formerly prevailing in Marxist-Leninist thought, the article continues, was that wars are inevitable as long as there is imperialism. However, the strength of the socialist camp has grown to such an extent that this former concept can now be revised to state that wars are no longer inevitable, although vigilance must be exercised in respect to imperialism, which is the policy that has been followed by the USSR during recent years. But the antiparty group could not conform to this point of view, and Molotov, in particular, continued to oppose the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, the treaty with Japan, the Austrian state treaty, and like measures.

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the issue of the "inevitability or non-inevitability of wars" actually had a considerable part in the controversy.)

In internal policy likewise, the article says, the antiparty group has opposed the reorganizing of the economic administration and the new agricultural policy, although the status of agriculture in 1953 was such that it

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threatened to hamper the entire economy. Nor could the antiparty group offer any alternatives to the positive measures adopted by the party. The policy of the antiparty group "would have led to the decline of industry and agriculture and to broken relations between workers and peasants, and even to hunger."

Furthermore, the antiparty group opposed the measures for eliminating the remaining vestiges of the cult of personality, and it is greatly guilty of the gross errors committed during earlier times. The group opposed all measures for countering bureaucracy, it opposed the personnel reductions in the party machine, and it has quoted classical Marxism-Leninism in an effort to hamper the carrying out of the new Marxism-Leninism, as set forth in the decisions of the 20th Congress.

One of the most important party principles, the article continues, is the preservation of party unity, but the antiparty group engaged, instead, in conspiracies against the collective party leadership; nor, was it able to comprehend the increase in the sense of responsibility to the party that the members have gained during the last three or four years.

In conclusion, the article discusses the attitudes of the Communist parties of other countries to the June decisions, stating that all of those parties have given those decisions their full support.

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The lead article in Agitator presents many of the same views as the Partinaya Zhizn article. However, the former stresses particularly that the antiparty group opposed the increasing of the rights of the member republics, and therefore, also the growth of friendship among the peoples of the USSR.

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The following definition of the Malenkov et al group given in the article is of particular interest: "In issues involving both internal policy and foreign policy, the recently exposed heretics (raskol'nikii; in current usage the word also means "dispersive elements") are sectarians (sektanty) and dogmatists (dogmatiki), and they represent a pedantic (nachetnicheskiy) attitude toward Marxism-Leninism that is not true to life."

All of these terms have been borrowed from the vocabulary of the Orthodox Church. The raskol'niki were those who represented antiquated beliefs in the time of Peter the Great; the nachetnikii in the services of the Orthodox Church are those who have become accustomed to rote reading of theological literature.

The article says also: "Dogmatism and the clinging to doctrines are not a smaller enemy than revisionism. When Lenin branded Kautsky a revisionist, he also showed him to be a dogmatist and a doctrinarian." And again: "Everyone is able to read Marx and Lenin, but the ability to understand them has been given only to those who can feel the pulse in the artery of life." . . . "How did Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov dare to call themselves Leninists when they trampled underfoot the Leninist principles of party unity, deeformed the party and its Leninist Central Committee, and disrupted the patty and the work of its leadership, the Central Committee?"

"The party rose against anti-Leninism.".... "The pitiful renegades." Etc.

The propagandists have thus been terms as severe as these, which for a long time will be repeated in speeches and articles. Whether they will lead to a heightening of popular indignation against the antiparty group remains to be seen.

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The quotations indicate also the extent to which

the controversy that erupted in June involves not only disagreements concerning issues of practical policy, but also doctrinal controversies, the appearance of which shows the importance attached to doctrine, not only in the search of substance for the propaganda needed in the party internal struggle, but also in such differences of concept as "conservatism", which is alien to the experience of some, and the "creative interpretation" of Marxist and Leninist doctrine that is alien to others.

* * * *

The 1 July issue of <u>Kommunist</u>, the leading party theoretical journal, was not released to the press until 27 July, although it is generally published early each month. The lead article in it also is devoted to the June decisions. While the article presents nothing really new, it stresses throughout the decisive importance of proper unity in the party.

The following quote is of interest: "Those in the antiparty group deviated from the Leninist concept of the leadership function of the communist party in a system of proletarian dictatorship. It is a fact that some of them, while pretending to profess that party dictatorship prevails in the USSR, actually repeated the Trotskyite defamation of the party, and some of the others, in seeking to establish that the position of governmental elements is more important than that of the party elements, distorted Leninist doctrine on the functions of the party after the victory of the proletarian revolution."

these expressions contain both an explanation and a certain amount of threatening verbiage. Apparently the vanquished opposition had found it necessary, during the attack on Khrushchev, to support its



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position by referring to excessive party influence and also to emphasize the greater importance of the governmental elements, in order to appeal to the bureaucrats, as stated directly elsewhere. The reference to the Trotskyite attitude seems to be a threat against the vanquished.

The vanquished group is accused also of continuing its activity behind the backs of the Presidium and the Central Committee, even after these bodies had pointed out the views of the opposition to be erroneous. The group is accused also of appealing to party unity after it saw that it had no support in the Central Committee. But, the article says, unity achieved on that basis necessarily lacks principle.

"It was not by chance that the White Guards and other enemies of the Soviet Union based their hopes of overthrowing the Soviet government on party disunity." (This is also a threat to the opposition.)

One of the most important conditions, it is stated, for party unity is unity in the leadership; the unanimous decision of the Central Committee preserved party unity.

The article also gives particular emphasis to the extremely great significance of the criticism arising from the cult of personality. It is stated that the sister communist parties did not all correctly understand the nature of the attack launched against the party by the imperialists and certain social democratic quarters when they undertook to criticize the cult of personality.

The antiparty group attempted to obscure their designs by appealing to the principles of collective leadership. (The intent of this apparently is that the opposition tried to gain the leadership in the Presidium and the Central Committee through a vote taken in the Presidium, in which it apparently had a majority at one time. eaw.) The article speaks extensively of the "correct" concept of collective leadership, one aspect of



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which is close contact with local organizations and groups of members.

The expression "aristocrats who believe themselves too important" is used at one point in regard to the vanquished.

In previous times when there have been crises in the CPSU, the decisive importance of party unity has always been stressed in connection with them, just as now, that the party really has monolithic unity. That has also been the case the death of Stalin. No new definitions or bits of doctrine have thus far been proposed in this respect. But it may not be possible to appeal to unity constantly if the course of events should lead to new controversies in the party in regard to procedural methods and objectives, as has happened on two occasions since Stalin's death, considering only the most dramatic of them, namely, the overthrow of Beriya and the changes that took place in June in the party leadership.

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